October 15th 2015 update This book is out of print check out http://www.amazon.ca/gp/offer-listing/B013RPD90M/ref=sr_1_2_twi_pap_1_olp?ie=UTF8&qid=1445123814&sr=8-2&keywords=A+Matter+of+Weeks+Rather+than+Months
I have ONE copy left...
Please note this book is 680 pages and weighs 1.6 kgs international air shipping can get expensive
Founded on 35 years of research into o the post-1945 Anglo-Rhodesian history, this book complements Richard Wood's The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 1953-1963 (1983) and So Far and No Further! Rhodesia's bid for independence during the retreat from empire: 1959-1965 (2005). Of So Far,
Michael Hartnack wrote that 'Once in a lifetime comes a book which must
force a total shift in the thinking person's perception of an epoch,
and of all the prominent characters who featured in it.' A Matter of Weeks Rather than Months
recounts the action and reaction to Ian Smith's unilateral declaration
of Rhodesia's independence, the second such declaration since the
American one of 1776. It examines the dilemmas of both sides. Smith's
problem was how to legitimise his rebellion to secure crucial investment
capital, markets, trade and more. His antagonist, the British Prime
Minister, Harold Wilson, was determined not to transfer sovereignty
until Rhodesia accepted African majority rule in common with the rest of
Africa. Given British feelings for their Rhodesian kith and kin and
Rhodesia's landlocked position, Wilson eschewed the use of force. He
could only impose sanctions but hoped they would defeat Smith 'in a
matter weeks rather than months'. The Rhodesians, however, evaded the
sanctions with such success that they forced Wilson to negotiate a
settlement. Negotiations were nevertheless doomed because the
self-confident Rhodesians would not accept a period of direct British
rule while rapid progress to majority rule was made or the imposition of
restraints on powers they had possessed since gaining self-government
in 1923. In tune with their allies in the African National Congress of
South Africa, the Rhodesian or Zimbabwean African nationalists had
already adopted the Marxist concept of the 'Armed Struggle' as a means
to power. Sponsored by the Communist Bloc, its surrogates and allies,
they began a series of armed incursions from their safe haven in Zambia.
Although bloodily and easily repulsed, they would learn from their
mistakes as the Rhodesian forces would discover in the 1970s.
Consequently, this is a tale of sanctions, negotiations and
counter-insurgency warfare.